Sejarah Zionisme, 1600-1918/Volume 1/Bab 19

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PALMERSTON PERIOD

The Conflict between Turkey and Egypt—Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey—Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt—The victory of Nezib—The Turkish Fleet—Wellington’s policy—The Eastern Question—Wellington’s opinion—The London Conference, 1840—The Insurrection in Syria and the Lebanon—An Ultimatum—The Capture of Acre by the British Fleet, 1840—Schemes of annexation.

The Palmerston period, 1837‒52, was a great time in England for the idea of the Restoration of Israel. It was a time of stirring events in the East, events which raised some of the most momentous problems that can engage the statesman’s mind. The English people watched from day to day with the deepest interest the progress of annexations, of conquest, of negotiations, which they believed would go far to decide the future development and destinies of the greatest nations of the world. The European horizon was so disturbed that a great political authority of the day is said to have declared that “if an angel from heaven were in the Foreign Office he would not preserve peace for three months.”

The facts are sufficiently familiar to most readers. But it will be necessary for our purpose to go over the oft-trodden ground, which must be done rapidly.

In 1839 a tremendous crisis broke out between Turkey and Egypt as the result of a series of conflicts and struggles. In the brief space of eight years (1831‒39) Mehemet Ali (1769‒1849) had contrived to overrun the whole of Syria, having organized a fleet and an army beyond the legitimate necessities of his government, by acts of tyranny and oppression against the very people for whose defence he pretended to have raised them; and he forced these wretched people, whom he was bound to protect, to join him in rebellion, thus fastening more firmly the chains with which he had shackled them. Having concentrated 100,000 men on the Turkish frontier, he at once threw off the mask and intimated to the European consuls his intention of declaring his independence unless his demand for the government of Syria for life and of Egypt en hérédité were conceded.

He struck the first blow, and was very successful during the first stage of the war. The victory of Nezib (24 June, 1839) was the last of his triumphs. The new army, which he had taken pains to organize, was only half trained. Still his power was unshaken, and his advantage was not confined to the land. The Turkish admiral, beaten by Mehemet Ali, and fearing for his life if he returned to Constantinople, determined on an act of treachery, which would ingratiate him with the victorious ruler of Egypt. He took the Turkish fleet, with some 20,000 men aboard, to Alexandria, and surrendered it to Mehemet Ali.

The surprise and astonishment which the suddenness of these occurrences caused did not allow English diplomacy much time to consider. It was necessary to intervene at once, unless the Ottoman Empire was to be broken up. Palmerston determined to carry out Wellington’s (1769‒1852) policy, and to reduce the apparently invincible Pasha to “a state of obedience and subordination to the Sultan” (1808‒1839), Mahmud II. (1785‒1839). The difficulties seemed formidable, but Palmerston’s conception of the diplomatic situation was unerring. He scouted the idea of actual intervention on Egyptian soil. The lessons of the battle of the Nile and of the earlier siege of Acre had not been thrown away upon a survivor of the struggle with Napoleon Bonaparte. A different strategic plan was adopted: a British squadron was to compel the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali.

The imminent perils and dangers which surrounded this undertaking from the political point of view were evident. A great international problem arose. The solution of those important and complex problems which include what is usually called the “Eastern Question” had long occupied a considerable place in the field of international politics, especially in England. There was scarcely one, perhaps, of the more eminent English diplomatists who had not distinguished himself in this department in a greater or a less degree; and there was scarcely an aspirant to foreign political activity and distinction who had not thought it one of the surest paths to his ambition to come forward as a champion in this arena. It must, however, be borne in mind that this question was continually taking on a new form, and accordingly opinions and interests were always changing. In 1839‒40 controversy about this question attained its greatest intensity, and the interested powers were in a position of the darkest perplexity.

After the traitorous defection of the Turkish fleet to the side of Mehemet Ali, five great Powers of Europe officially intimated to the Porte that they had determined to discuss and settle together the embarrassing Eastern question, and ultimately a Conference was called together in London, at which the Ambassadors of these Powers were to meet with full authority from their Governments to bring the matter to a definite issue. It appeared throughout that France was favourable to Mehemet Ali’s ambitious projects, whilst England had decided to compel him to evacuate Syria forthwith and to restore the fleet before it would entertain any proposition of his to be allowed to retain Egypt in hereditary possession, or any part of Syria during his lifetime. The negotiations in London dragged on slowly; month after month passed by, and the high contracting parties came to no definite decision. Everybody in England was anxious that Great Britain should play an important rôle in the Eastern Question. The state of the East had become utterly corrupt and hopeless. Great Britain considered that it was in its interest to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. What was meant by this principle? Great Britain as an Asiatic not less than a European Power was interested to see that the Ottoman Empire was made thoroughly independent and enabled to progress by consolidating and developing its provinces. As to Syria, everybody in England was aware that its possession was essential for the security of the richest and most important provinces of Asiatic Turkey, to which it was the military key. This was sufficiently demonstrated by the events which actually took place.

On the 25th May, 1840, an insurrection of an alarming character broke out in Syria and The Lebanon among the Druses and Christians against the Emir and the Egyptian Government. On the 15th of July, 1840, an event occurred which brought the affairs of the Levant to a crisis. A convention was signed in London between England, Russia, Austria and Prussia, without the concurrence of France, whereby an ultimatum was delivered to Mehemet Ali, calling on him to evacuate Palestine. The four Powers demanded of him, first, a prompt submission to the Sultan (1839‒1861) Abdul Medjid (1823‒1861) as his Sovereign; secondly, the immediate restoration of the Turkish fleet; thirdly, a prompt evacuation of Syria, Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities. Moreover the four Powers declared the ports of Syria and Egypt to be in a state of blockade. Consequently Acre, the fortress which had been the great depot and arsenal of Mehemet Ali, and which in 1799 had withstood Bonaparte after the twelfth assault, when he had been defeated by Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith (1764‒1840) with a few sailors and marines and a force of undisciplined Turks, was now successfully bombarded by the English Admiral, Sir Robert Stopford (1768‒1847), and placed in possession of the Sultan’s troops. The fortress, which was considered invulnerable, surrendered on the 3rd of November, 1840. Jaffa surrendered to the new garrison of Acre, a few days after the fall of the fortress. On the 3rd of November the happy tidings of the fall of Acre were brought to Constantinople, and the Government issued orders for public rejoicings; on the 19th of that month the Turkish Governor was officially informed that the garrison and inhabitants of Jerusalem had given allegiance to the Porte.

The question of the future of Palestine now arose. Was Palestine simply to be left to Turkey or was Great Britain to secure some important places? The prevalent tendency in English opinion was in favour of the annexation of Acre and Cyprus. Acre, in the hands of England, or of any other nation commanding the sea, could be made really impregnable, and Cyprus seemed also to be of great strategic importance, especially to England. The reasons for such an annexation were palpable. England and her Allies had not merely rescued Syria, they had absolutely saved the whole Ottoman Empire. After the battle of Nezib had given the defiles of Mount Taurus to Mehemet Ali, nothing could have obstructed the rebels’ triumphant march to Constantinople. The Allies had thus rendered to the Ottoman Empire the greatest possible service that one State can receive from another. Gratitude alone might have suggested a more valuable acknowledgment of this service than Acre and Cyprus; but as the service had been rendered at some risk, and at enormous expense, justice demanded that it should be paid for; and nobody could suggest that it would be paid for too dearly by a strip of territory which was of little value to Turkey, though useful to England, and which in British hands would assuredly supply the Porte with a fortress that could never be established in its own territory. Acre and Cyprus garrisoned by British troops would give Turkey the surest protection. Attention was also called to the fact that no spot in the world was associated with so many proud recollections as Acre, the theatre of British gallantry from the days of Richard Cœur de Lion (1157‒1199) to those of Admiral Sir W. Sidney Smith and Admiral Sir Robert Stopford. Another consideration had great weight with English opinion. The possession of Acre would open a road for the return of Biblical truth to the land from which that truth had spread to the human race; and Englishmen would feel guilty of sin if they failed to impress upon their Government the need of seizing this glorious and blessed opportunity. To take, however, the more utilitarian view of the matter, Great Britain, occupying the impregnable position of Acre, would not be under the necessity of seeking the freedom of the overland route to India from any other Power. She would command it at all times. Acre in the hands of Great Britain would be a perfect guarantee against revolts in Egypt or in Syria, and would in fact ensure the Turkish Empire against the only danger that could threaten it on the side of Asia.

The effects of an English settlement in Syria on the general interests of mankind presented a more serious question. Syria and the adjacent countries were in a worse state than they had been 2000 years ago. While the deserts of America and Australasia had been regained for the use of man, while India had been brought to peace and unity and its worst superstitions had been modified, if not altogether extirpated, by the influence of European civilization, man had given place to the savage creatures of the wilderness in those countries from which all that he knows of good, was originally derived. An English settlement in Syria would begin the work of regeneration in the most venerable and interesting country in the world. England would be to Syria and to the adjacent countries all that she had been to India—the protector of the weak, the common arbiter, the universal peacemaker. Her laws and her liberties enable her to fulfil that function, her commercial interests fit her to undertake it, while her wealth, her naval supremacy and her colonial power furnish her with the means required for the purpose. Why should any other power oppose her acquiring that region? That its acquisition would add to her commercial resources and to her defensive strength had to be conceded. But had no nation ever before sought to increase her commercial resources and add to her defensive strength by means in themselves legitimate, which would not in any way infringe upon the rights or interests of others? The advancement of the world in civilization and happiness must remain for ever at a standstill, if each nation is to be held in check by the jealousy of the others. This was the attitude of public opinion on this question from the point of view of human progress and of British interests.